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Abstract 
This article presents an overview of developments in the economic literature related to 
interaction of monetary, macroprudential and fiscal policies. The combination of fiscal and 
monetary policies in Ukraine and other world between 2005 and 2018 has been analyzed. 
After several years of a synchronized expansionary mix, monetary policy has been the most 
aggressive tool across countries. In response to the global financial crisis, approaches to 
identifying the policy mix have been reviewed. This gave rise to a new paradigm for 
macroeconomic and financial stability. This has also been the effect of financial stability 
becoming a new objective in the policy mix. In Ukraine, high economic growth is 
accompanied by a relative increase in inflation. Under modern conditions in Ukraine, the 
coordination of monetary, fiscal and sectoral policies needs to be improved: a monetary 
policy targets inflation; while using fiscal and sectoral policies create the preconditions for 
structural support and stimulation of economic growth. In other words, coordination of 
monetary, macroprudential and fiscal policies should ensure that inflation is reduced and GDP 
grows. Based on the findings of empirical and theoretical studies the lack of clear impact of 
monetary policy instruments on financial stability has been established. There is contradiction 
of goals between inflation targeting and ensuring economic growth. This fact necessitates the 
use of monetary policy instruments to curb inflation, macro-prudential policy instruments to 
ensure financial stability, and fiscal policy instruments to promote economic growth. The 
priority objective of monetary policy is the level of inflation, while the level of business 
activity can be provided with instruments of both monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, the 
limitation of systemic risk in the banking sector of the economy and ensuring financial 
stability are achieved by the macroprudential policy instruments. It has been established that 
the optimal balance between policies depends on the state of the economy and the business 
cycle stage. Under certain circumstances, macroprudential and monetary policy tools can be 
used together. The principles of coordination of goals and objectives of macroprudential, 
monetary and fiscal policies have been formed. They are scientific validity, priority of goals 
and consideration of mutual influence. 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, macroprudential policy, fiscal policy, monetary and fiscal 
restriction (expansion), policies coordination.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The consequences of the global financial crisis 2007–2008 have formed in the 
scientific environment the opinion that price stability does not provide 
macroeconomic financial stability. The accumulation of financial imbalances 
occurred even in the face of low inflation and small GDP gaps. That is why such 
goals of central banks as ensuring financial stability (counteracting systemic risks) 
and price stability should be distinguished. The goal of financial stability is achieved 
through the effective use of macro-prudential policy tools that limit excess growth 
and mitigate the effects of cyclical fluctuations in the economy. 
There is a plethora of research on the rational organization of macroprudential 
policies in the modern economic literature. However, a number of issues, related to 
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the interaction of macroprudential, monetary, fiscal and structural policies, remain 
underdeveloped. 
That is why theoretical and methodological issues of interaction will be 
considered in this research: 
– macroprudential and monetary policies; 
– monetary and fiscal policies. 
Conducting such research aims to develop principles for coordinating the goals 
and objectives of macro-prudential, monetary and fiscal policies on the basis of 
maintaining financial stability by strengthening the resilience of the financial sector 
and preventing systemic risk. 
Apparently, macroprudential policy should ensure financial stability, while 
monetary policy should ensure price stability. At the same time, the effective use of 
the tools of both mentioned above policies requires the forecasting and evaluation of 
their potential mutual impact. 
Taking into account the lack of experience of using macro-prudential policy 
instruments, there is a possibility that they will be implemented inefficient. In the 
case of macroprudential policy instruments being inefficient, monetary tools may be 
additionally used. In this case, it is necessary to increase the role of monetary policy 
in ensuring financial stability. At the same time, in the case of limited monetary 
policy effectiveness (for example, for most small open economies), enhance the role 
of macroprudential instruments would be the most appropriate decision. However, 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy instruments in ensuring price stability is 
debatable. 
It should be added that the optimal organization of macroprudential policy is 
very important to ensure its effective interaction with other government policies. 
Policy coordination can improve the results of achieving the goal of financial 
stability. Therefore, it is rational to delegate the function of ensuring financial 
stability to one authority – the central bank. At the same time, possible contradictions 
in achieving policy goals require the separation of two policy functions through 
separate decision-making, accountability and communication structures. 
Consequently, achieving the objectives of the study requires identifying the 
transmission channels of monetary policy impact on financial stability. They are: 
borrower balance sheet (default) channel; risk-shifting channel; exchange rate 
channel; risk-taking channel; asset price channel [24]. 
In the case of a borrower default channel (balance sheet channel), monetary 
policy may impair financial stability by affecting borrowing restrictions and 
increasing the risk of default. First, tight monetary policy increase the debt load for 
floating lending rate borrowers. Second, restrictive monetary policy affects economic 
activity, which has a negative impact on borrowers’ income flows and loan 
repayment. Third, the increase in interest rates reduces the cost of the loan due to 
falling asset prices, which further reduces access to credit. In other words, tight 
monetary policy leads to an increase in the likelihood of borrowers default, a decline 
in banks' profits and an increase in non-performing loans. According to Allen and 
Gale (2000), the deployment of such a mechanism could eventually lead to a 
financial crisis [2; 13]. Similar conclusions are reached by scientists in empirical 
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studies. For example, in Spain during 1884-2006 the increase in central bank rates 
had a negative impact on the likelihood of borrowers default and the quality of bank 
loan portfolios (Jimenez and others, 2009). [17]. In the case of securitization of loans, 
an increase in default rates may lead to a fall in asset prices, which could further 
cause a financial crisis [12; 15; 22].  
Given the above, it can be concluded that restrictive monetary policy can lead to 
a deterioration in financial stability as a result of increased debt load on borrowers 
and an increase in non-performing loans. 
The mechanism of the next transmission channel – risk shifting – is similar in 
nature to the previous one, but has a fundamental difference: in this case, the source 
of instability is restrictive monetary policy and rising rates. Rising central bank rates 
may lower the margin of financial intermediaries and cause them to seek increased 
risk. Bhatacharya argues that financial institutions with higher leverage and lower 
margins will choose more risky assets (Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1982) [5].  
The effect of rising interest rates on interest margins is explained by banks 
providing short-term floating-rate funding and long-term lending by fixed rates. 
Lowering the margin in this case can lead to investing in more risky assets and 
increasing leverage to maintain the level of return on equity, thereby shifting value 
from depositors and lenders to bank owners. The effect of such a channel is usually 
amplified immediately before a crisis. This channel was empirically confirmed for 
the crisis in the United States in 2004 [11]. 
Another channel that confirms the negative impact of restriction on financial 
stability is the exchange rate channel. In open economies, monetary policy can affect 
the exchange rate and capital flows that determine the existence of the exchange rate 
channel: higher central bank rates cause foreign investment to flow into the country 
and lead to excessive credit expansion [14; 21].  
In banking systems, capital inflows can lead to credit expansion and credit 
leverage increase. This creates a situation where raising domestic interest rates can 
lead to excess capital inflows and increasing lending. Given the low monetary rates in 
developed countries, this dilemma is faced by developing economies (eg Brazil, Peru 
and Turkey). However, it should be added that this channel was also relevant after the 
crisis: in Iceland, high interest rates stimulated capital inflows through the banking 
sector and overheated economy. In Iceland, inflation has led to a rise in central bank 
rates, which in turn has led to an increase in capital inflows, thereby creating a so-
called “negative feedback loop” [18]. Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
have also faced this dilemma before the crisis. At the same time, in some empirical 
studies, the rise in financial instability has been linked to expansionary monetary 
policy. This negative impact is related to the implementation of the channel of 
excessive risk taking and the value of assets. In the case of the excessive risk taking 
channel, monetary policy may affect the incentives for financial intermediaries 
(primarily banks) to take risk. In the case of expansionary policies (with low interest 
rates) banks’ spreads will shrink. This may encourage banks to look for other sources 
of profit growth. They are increasing financial leverage and simplifying credit 
standards. It is associated with taking additional risks [6; 8]. Scientists also identify 
factors that may exacerbate a transmission mechanism of risk-taking channel: low 
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interest rates reduce the likelihood of borrowers default and capital requirements [1]. 
It should be emphasized that empirical confirmation of this mechanism has been 
obtained in studies based on micro-level balances of individual banks [16]. However, 
in the case of macro data analysis, there was no significant effect of rates on leverage 
and credit growth [8; 25; 21]. 
The expansion of the next channel (asset price) is also driven by expansionary 
monetary policy. As central bank rates decline, the value of creditors' assets and the 
net worth of borrowers will increase. In response, supply and demand for credit are 
increasing. This leads to a further increase in asset prices through the financial 
accelerator mechanism [4]. At the same time, it should be noted that this mechanism 
has not been properly validated in empirical studies. So, Del Negro and Otrock 
(2007) believe that the impact of monetary policy on US housing prices has been 
relatively low compared to other factors [7]. It has been proved that interest rates 
were relatively low in some developed economies (Ireland, Spain), while Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom had relatively high real rates, but excessive 
house prices were characteristic of all economies [24]. 
The generalized characteristics of the above-mentioned transmission channels of 
monetary instruments’ impact on financial stability are shown in Table. 1. 
 
Table 1. Transmission channels of the impact of monetary instruments on financial 
stability 
Channels Mechanism 
The source of 
instability 
Borrower balance sheet 
(default) channel 
Rising Rates → Declining Business Activity and Revenue → Rising 
Non-performing loans 
Credit restrictions 
Risk-taking channel Lower rates → Increase in activity and leverage → “Overheating 
economy” The behavior of 
financial institutions  Risk-shifting channel Rising Rates → Declining Margins → Seeking sources to increase 
profits (leverage and credit risk) 
Asset price channel Decrease in interest rates → Purchase of assets for credit → Increase 
in asset prices 
Externalities 
 Exchange rate channel Rising Rates → Reinforcing Exchange Rate → Foreign Investment 
Inflow → Credit Expansion 
 
Source: [24] 
 
Therefore, as Table 1 shows, there are controversial effects of monetary policy 
on financial stability. Borrower default, risk shifting or the exchange rate channels 
are associated with rising rates, excessive risk-taking or asset price channels are 
related to easing of monetary policy conditions. 
In view of the above, there is a need to further justify the delineation of the 
objectives of maintaining financial and price stability. Further evidence of the need 
for such a distinction is the results of studies (Table 2). 
The main arguments in favor of the distinction between monetary and 
macroprudential policies are as follows: 
1. In Ukraine, despite some positive developments, monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms are not well-established and predictable, and given the 
transformation processes in the economy, the final formation of such mechanisms can 
only be expected in the mid-term perspective. 
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Table 2. Review of empirical research on monetary and macro-prudential policy 
coordination 
Author and year 
of study 
Period and country (s) The main results 
M. Gertler and  
S. Gilchrist 
(1994) 
[24] 
USA (1960-1990) Small firms are more sensitive to economic fluctuations (cyclical and 
monetary) and are more dependent on lending conditions. Increasing the 
rate leads to a deterioration of firms’ financial stability and stability in the 
market. 
Jiménez and 
others (2009) 
[16] 
Spain (24,052 
observations 1884-2008) 
The effect of overnight rates on banks' risk appetite was assessed. Lower 
rates cause banks to take more risk in lending, more so for low-cap banks. 
Merrouche and 
Nier (2010) [21] 
OECD (1999-2007) The claim that a state where the "interest rate stays low for too long" 
affects the accumulation of imbalances is refuted. Overall, monetary policy 
instruments have had little impact on instability. 
Landier, Sraer, 
Thesmar (2011), 
Sengupta (2010) 
[20] 
USA. 192,973 loans 
provided by New 
Century Financial 
Corporation в 2004 р. 
In 2004, Fed rates were raised in response to rising real estate prices. 
Instead, the company providing sub-prime mortgage loans (New Century 
Financial Corporation) has increased its level of risk and focused its 
activity on aggressive growth of the loan portfolio. 
Hahm, Mishkin, 
Shin, Kwanho 
Shin (2012) [14] 
Open developing 
economies 
Monetary and macroprudential policies goals should be distinguished. For 
example, monetary rates can not be raised to mitigate asset price bubbles. 
Macroprudential policy tools should be used instead. 
Altunbas, 
Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez 
(2012) [3] 
A sample of 583 
European banks 
Well-capitalized and highly liquid banks suffered less from the crisis in 
2007-2009. However, the effect of capitalization and liquidity was lower 
for countries with a long low interest rate period before the crisis. 
Frait, Malovaná, 
Tomšík (2015) 
[9], Adrian, 
Liang (2016) [1] 
Czech Republic Macro-prudential and monetary policy instruments should be distinguished, 
as their interdependence is difficult to predict. Macroprudential instruments 
are more prolonged, so monetary policy instruments can only be used to 
maintain financial stability when a more flexible instrument is required. 
IMF (2013) [24] A number of countries in 
the world 
The costs outweigh the benefits after a monetary shock, so monetary policy 
instruments should be used for excessive credit growth. Although, on the 
whole, the interaction between politics depends on a number of 
circumstances: the unemployment rate, excessive credit growth, etc. 
Aino Silvo 
(2016) [23] 
– Using only monetary instruments to smooth cycles will lead to a 
contradiction between inflation and output. Macroprudential tools allow to 
solve this problem. 
Gambacorta and 
Murcia (2017) 
[10] 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and the United States 
(1990-2012) 
Macroprudential tools are more effective when used in conjunction with 
monetary (one-way) tools. 
Soyoung Kim 
and Aaron 
Mehrotra (2017) 
[19] 
Australia, Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand 
(Q1:2000–Q2:2012) 
Macroprudential and monetary policy tools can be used to achieve the 
same goals. In this case, their "double effect" and interdependence must be 
taken into account. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
2. There is no clear impact of monetary policy instruments on financial 
stability. Borrower default, risk-shifting or exchange rate channel are associated with 
an increase in interest rates, while excessive risk-taking or asset pricing channels 
occur when monetary rates drop. 
3. There is a contradiction between meeting inflation targets and ensuring the 
required level of economic growth. The priority objective of monetary policy is the 
level of inflation, while ensuring the level of business activity can be provided with 
tools of both monetary and fiscal policies. And the limitation of systemic risk to the 
banking sector of the economy and to ensuring financial stability is achieved through 
the tools of macroprudential policy. 
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4. Under certain conditions, macro-prudential and monetary policy tools may 
be used together. Such conditions are keeping priorities of the goals and taking into 
account mutual influence. 
Another area of research is to evaluate the coordination of monetary and fiscal 
policies. It should be noted that the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has led to a 
revision of approaches to fiscal and monetary policy coordination. Monetary 
instruments have shown poor performance during the crisis, that is why most current 
research focuses on intensifying the use of fiscal instruments. In particular, interest 
in the Keynesian fiscal multiplier is returning. 
Fiscal and monetary policies have been shown to have some differences 
depending on the region (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of key indicators of monetary and fiscal policies of 
individual countries during 1999–2018 
 
Source: own development based on statistics from the World Bank, IMF and the Bank of France  
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In Canada, the central bank pursued expansionary policies until 2004, followed 
by increases in rates in 2005-2007 and a further decline until 2015. At the same time, 
the gradual increase in monetary and real rates, in our view, cannot be attributed to 
restrictive policies, but rather reflects a possible positive trend towards the banking 
system's exit from the so-called “liquidity trap”. Canada’s fiscal policy focused on the 
surplus budget until 2007, and the aftermath of the 2008-2013 crisis necessitated an 
expansionary fiscal policy with a resumption of positive values in 2014-2015. 
In the United States, the emergence of the so-called dotcom bubble and the 
subsequent collapse of the stock markets necessitated an expansionary fiscal 
policy. And the decline in monetary rates began in 2001. The period of 2004-2006 
is identified as period of restriction, both monetary and fiscal. However, in 
response to the crisis, both policies could be described as expansionist since 2007, 
but since 2013, the budget deficit has been narrowing with a slight increase in the 
monetary rate. 
The combination of fiscal and monetary policies in the UK and France is 
similar to the situation in the US: since the crisis began, monetary policy has 
become more aggressive, while fiscal policy has become restrictive since 2009. 
In Ukraine, almost all years are characterized by budget deficits, but in stable 
periods, it is reduced with a significant increase in the realization of systemic risk. 
The relationship between the main variables that characterize Ukraine's fiscal and 
monetary policies is illustrated by the data in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between the main variables characterizing the fiscal and 
monetary policies of Ukraine 
Source: own elaboration based on statistics from NBU 
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As data in Figure 2 illustrates, there is slight negative relationship between 
the fiscal deficit and the size of the real interest rate: the instability of the 
economy also affects the financial sector, i.e. periods of significant deficit are 
characterized by high inflation and low real rates. 
Comparing the relationship between GDP dynamics and the real interest rate 
suggests the following: lower interest real rates are associated with GDP growth in 
times of stable economic conditions (1996-2008), but in case of crisis, low real 
interest rates mean high inflation and are accompanied by the negative dynamics of 
GDP. 
This indicates a significant difference between the Ukrainian economy and the 
developed ones, where high economic growth is accompanied by a relative increase 
in inflation. Under the modern conditions, the coordination of monetary, fiscal and 
sectoral policies needs to be improved: monetary policies aims at targeting inflation, 
while fiscal and sectoral policies should be focused on creating the preconditions for 
structural support and stimulation of economic growth. In other words, coordination 
of monetary, macro-prudential and fiscal policies should bring about a reduction in 
inflation and GDP growth. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the results of the study, we can conclude that there is no proper and 
reasonable coordination of the government's fiscal policy with the monetary policy 
of the central bank in Ukraine. Government's social-oriented policy result in 
household’s income growth. At the same time, income growth is much higher than 
the economy and labor productivity growth. These factors stimulate the growth of 
demand, credit expansion of banks and lead to an increase in inflation. 
The need to overcome the negative impact of systemic risk on the banking 
sector and the economy of Ukraine as a whole requires formulating principles of 
effective coordination of macroprudential, monetary and fiscal policies: 
– scientific validity – the implementation of the instruments of each of these 
policies should be carried out in accordance with scientific developments and 
conducted empirical studies on the basis of macroeconomic forecasting, taking into 
account national specificities; 
– priority of goals – in order to avoid conflict of goals, it is necessary to 
maintain their priorities (price stability – for monetary policy and financial stability 
for macroprudential); 
– consideration of mutual influence – applying the tools of individual policies 
it is necessary to take into account both their possible “double” or controversial 
effect. 
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